

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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FROM: PARIS

TO: Secretary of State

NO: POLTO 2700, MARCH 18, 9 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

PRIORITY

Control: 11893

Rec'd: MARCH 18, 1959

9:17 PM

SENT DEPARTMENT POLTO 2700; REPEATED INFORMATION BONN POLTO 458, LONDON POLTO 726, MOSCOW POLTO 147, BERLIN 58.

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RECENT THOUGHTFUL TELEGRAMS BONN'S 1899 AND MOSCOW'S 1747 TO DEPT STIMULATE USRO TO SUBMIT FOLLOWING COMMENTS ON BERLIN AND GERMAN CRISIS.

COMMENTS ARE DIRECTED TO WHAT WE CONSIDER TO BE BASICALLY FALLBACK WESTERN POSITIONS, AND WE DO NOT DISCUSS TACTICAL PROBLEM OF HOW WE WOULD MOVE TO THESE POSITIONS FROM PRESUMABLY MORE CONSERVATIVE WESTERN POSITIONS WHICH WE ASSUME WE WOULD ADOPT AT OUTSET OF ANY CONFERENCE. THEY REFLECT, NEVERTHELESS, OUR EVALUATION OF WHAT WILL BE NECESSARY TO BRING WESTERN OPINION ALONG WITH US SHOULD NEGOTIATIONS FAIL TO RESOLVE EAST-WEST DIFFERENCES ON BASIS WE WOULD DESIRE.

1. MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM IS TO ENSURE UNITY OF ALLIANCE OVER ACTION TO BE TAKEN. AS WE INDICATED EARLIER, THIS WILL REQUIRE CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT WEST IS EXHAUSTING EVERY REASONABLE PEACEFUL REMEDY BEFORE RESORTING TO FORCE. AN INESCAPABLE LINK THEREFORE EXISTS BETWEEN OUR NEGOTIATING POSITION AT A CONFERENCE WITH THE RUSSIANS AND THE QUESTION OF WHEN WEST WOULD HAVE TO USE FORCE.

WE ARE DISTURBED AT REFERENCES IN BONN'S AND PARIS' 3196 WITH REGARD TO THE POSSIBILITY OF THE U.S. ALONE BEING WILLING TO UNDERTAKE NUCLEAR WAR. IN OUR VIEW THE QUESTION WHETHER

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WEST WOULD BE WILLING TO UNDERTAKE NUCLEAR WAR DEPENDS ON WHAT THE NUCLEAR WAR WAS ABOUT.

IN OUR VIEW, THE LEGAL JUSTIFICATION OF OUR PRESENCE IN BERLIN AND OUR ACCESS THERETO IS PERFECTLY SOUND AND SHOULD NOT BE SURRENDERED. BUT IT NEVERTHELESS IS NOT THE BEST OR ONLY WAY TO PRESENT THE MATTER FOR PUBLIC OPINION. IF WESTERN OPINION IS TO BE BROUGHT ALONG, IT WILL HAVE TO BE ON THE PRIMARY BASIS THAT WE HAVE RESPONSIBILITIES TO THE CITIZENS OF BERLIN AND THAT WE DO NOT INTEND TO SACRIFICE THESE FREE INDIVIDUALS. PUBLIC OPINION WILL ACCEPT THE NEED FOR BOTH OUR ACCESS TO BERLIN AND THE NEED TO MAINTAIN WESTERN TROOPS IN BERLIN TO PROTECT THAT FREEDOM, IF WE ADEQUATELY EXPLAIN AND PRESENT THESE TWO POINTS.

WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT WESTERN OPINION IS PREPARED TO STAND WITH US ON THE ISSUE OF INSPECTION OF, OR STAMPING OF, IDENTIFICATION DOCUMENTS BY DDR PERSONNEL IN THE EVENT OF TURNOVER. WHILE, FOR PURPOSES OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS, THEY WOULD BACK US IN INSISTING ON THE RIGHT NOT TO HAVE INSPECTION OR STAMPING ACCOMPLISHED, IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, WE DO NOT THINK THAT THE ALLIANCE OR THE PEOPLES OF THE WEST ARE PREPARED TO GO TO ALL-OUT WAR ON THIS ISSUE WHICH CANNOT BE PORTRAYED AS DIRECTLY AFFECTING ACCESS ITSELF AND IS NOT DIRECTLY RELATED TO PIECEMEAL SOVIET TAKEOVER OF FREE LANDS OR PEOPLES. IT IS THE FEAR OF THAT SOVIET TAKEOVER WHICH IS THE SOLE COMMON BOND WHICH CAN BE DEVELOPED INTO REAL FIRMNESS WHEN A SHOWDOWN COMES. ON THE OTHER HAND, A REAL INTERFERENCE WITH ACCESS COULD, IN OUR VIEW, BE THE TRICK WHICH WOULD BRING WESTERN OPINION TO SUPPORT US IN A SHOWDOWN.

WE THEREFORE THINK THE SITUATION WILL BE RIFE TO EFFECT A HORSE-TRADE ON THE STATUS OF BERLIN INCLUDING ACCESS. ON THE ONE HAND, THE WEST SHOULD SEEK TO OBTAIN FROM RUSSIANS A CLEAR RE-STATEMENT AND CLARIFICATION OF SOVEREIGN AND THE CITIZEN RIGHTS NOW EMBODIED IN A MIXED SERIES OF AGREEMENTS, ACCORDS, AGREEMENTS AND PRACTICES.

TO BALANCE THIS, THE WEST SHOULD BE READY TO ACCEPT DDR

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AUTHORITIES AS OFFICIALS CHARGED WITH FUNCTIONING OF SUPERVISION OF ACCESS. SUCH PROPOSAL WOULD LET WEST ADOPT APPEARANCE OF REASONABLENESS AND YET PRESERVE RESPONSIBILITY OF RUSSIANS.

BELIEVE FOREGOING WOULD MAKE IT CLEAR TO PUBLIC OPINION THAT ONUS WAS ON COMMUNISTS, SHOULD THEY USE FORCE TO STOP ACCESS AFTER REJECTING FOREGOING PROPOSAL. WE RECOGNIZE SOVIETS MAY REJECT FOREGOING, SAYING THAT WE SHOULD COME TO AGREEMENT WITH GDR AND NOT RUSSIANS. BUT WE BELIEVE PUBLIC OPINION CAN BE LED TO RECOGNIZE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN RECOGNIZING GDR AND SOME MODUS VIVENDI SUCH AS WE PROPOSE.

AS WE SEE IT, KEY POINT AS TO WHERE WE DRAW LINE RE DEALING WITH GDR IS DIFFERENCE BETWEEN RECOGNIZING GDR GOVERNMENT (AND HENCE CONFIRMING COMMUNIST CAPTIVITY OF EAST GERMANS) AS AGAINST HAVING SIMPLE CONTACT WITH PUPPET FUNCTIONARIES ON CLEARLY DEFINED OPERATIONS COVERED BY SOVIET GUARANTEES.

11. ALSO RE BERLIN, WE BELIEVE PROPOSAL TO INCREASE CONTACTS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST GERMANS COULD BE HIGHLIGHTED TO OUR ADVANTAGE. IN REJECTING RUSSIAN PROPOSAL FOR "FREE CITY", WE COULD AGAIN PROPOSE REMOVING RESTRICTIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST BERLIN SO THAT INFORMATION AND CULTURAL MATERIALS BE PERMITTED TO CROSS BOUNDS FREELY AND CITIZENS BE ABLE TO MOVE AND COLLABORATE ON BUSINESS AND CULTURAL BASIS. SUGGEST ALSO POSSIBILITY WEST COULD PROPOSE A CITIZENS' COMMITTEE FOR BERLIN, COMPOSED OF EQUAL NUMBER OF EAST AND WEST BERLIN REPRESENTATIVES OF BUSINESS, LABOR, RELIGIOUS AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS TO MEET ALTERNATIVELY IN EAST AND WEST BERLIN, TO DEAL WITH DAY TO DAY PROBLEMS AFFECTING BOTH HALVES OF CITY.

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Control: 11882  
Rec'd: MARCH 18, 1959  
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FROM: PARIS

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TO: Secretary of State

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III. SIMILARLY, WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT WESTERN OPINION IS READY TO GO TO WAR OVER THE ISSUE OF GERMAN REUNIFICATION. GERMANS HAVE SAID CONFERENCE SHOULD NOT FAIL OVER THAT ISSUE. THEREFORE, WHETHER OR NOT GERMAN REUNIFICATION APPEARS SPECIFICALLY ON THE AGENDA OF A MEETING WITH THE RUSSIANS IS OF RELATIVELY SECONDARY IMPORTANCE IN THE EYES OF THE WESTERN WORLD, AS THEY CONSIDER ANY IMPENDING NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS AS INTENDED TO OBIVATE A POSSIBLE SHOOTING CRISIS RATHER THAN TO LEAD TO A COMPLETE SOLUTION OF THE DIVISION OF EUROPE.

WE NEVERTHELESS BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE A GRAVE MISTAKE TO GIVE THE RUSSIAN THE OPPORTUNITY TO CLAIM THAT A LIMITED AGENDA CONSTITUTED RENUNCIATION OF THE IDEA OF THE REUNIFICATION OF GERMANY. WHILE IN LIGHT OF SOVIET ADAMANCY IT IS QUITE CLEAR THAT THE RUSSIAN IS NOT GOING TO AGREE TO GERMAN REUNIFICATION AT ANY CONFERENCE, WE THINK IT NOT IMPOSSIBLE THAT THE RUSSIAN MIGHT AGREE TO THE ULTIMATE REUNIFICATION OF GERMANY AS A GOAL TO WHICH ALL SHOULD WORK. WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD SEEK TO GET SUCH AN AGREEMENT, ALTHOUGH OF COURSE OUR BASIC POSITION ON PROMPT REUNIFICATION WOULD, WE ASSUME, BE OUR INITIAL POSTURE. THEREFORE WE THINK THAT THE AGENDA SHOULD BE WORDED IN SUCH WAY AS TO LET US OBTAIN THAT RESULT.

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IV. WE CONSIDER SOVIET "PEACE TREATY" TO BE CATCH-ALL DOCUMENT, INCLUDING AS IT DOES EUROPEAN SECURITY AND REGIONAL DISARMAMENT MATTERS ALONG WITH QUESTIONS OF POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. FOR PUBLIC OPINION, BELIEVE WE SHOULD HAVE COUNTERPROPOSALS ON ALL SCORES, THOUGH TEND TO BELIEVE THEY SHOULD NOT BE PRESENTED AS SINGLE PACKAGE IN PEACE TREATY. THUS EXCUSES FOR SOVIETS SIGNING SEPARATE PEACE TREATY WITH GDR COVERING THESE POINTS WOULD BE COUNTERED.

V. SECURITY AND/OR DISARMAMENT. WE BELIEVE THAT WEST SHOULD COME FORWARD WITH ILLUSTRATIVE BUT SPECIFIC PROPOSALS RE LIMITS OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS. WHILE THIS HAS OBVIOUS DANGER OF SOVIETS POCKETING ANY PROPOSAL RE LIMITATIONS WE PUT FORWARD AND THEN ASKING FOR BIGGER CONCESSIONS, BELIEVE WE ARE NOW AT POINT WHERE IT IS NECESSARY TO SPECIFICALLY FLESH OUT OUR 1955 SKELETON OFFER IN WAY THAT WOULD NOT PREJUDICE DETERRENT AND DEFENSIVE STRENGTH OF WEST RELATIVE TO EAST.

KEY QUESTION IS WHETHER WE MUST MAINTAIN COPPER RIVET BETWEEN GERMAN REUNIFICATION AND EUROPEAN SECURITY. ASSUMING ANY SUCCESS IN PROPOSAL OF PARAGRAPH III, RECOMMEND CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO PROPOSING THRESHOLD STEP PRIOR TO ACCOMPLISHMENT OF GERMAN REUNIFICATION WHICH WOULD BE BASED ON TWO GENERAL CONCEPTS:

(A) ESTABLISHMENT OF INSPECTION SCHEME ON BOTH SIDES OF DIVIDING LINE;

(B) SOME SPECIFIC REDUCTIONS IN WESTERN FORCES IN PROPORTION TO LIMITATIONS ON COMMUNIST FORCES WHICH, IN LIGHT

GEOGRAPHICAL AND POWER ASPECTS OF COMMUNIST BLOC WOULD BE ROUGHLY EQUIVALENT.

VI. RE SPECIFIC POINT OF CONTINGENCY PLANNING RE ACCESS TO BERLIN IN RELATION TO POSSIBILITY OF UNITED NATIONS ACTION, WE ARE CONCERNED AT RISK OF GOING TO UNITED NATIONS ON ISSUE WHERE RUSSIANS NOT PATENTLY ENGAGED IN USE OF FORCE AND WEST ITSELF COULD BE ACCUSED OF BEING IN MIDST OF "WAR-LIKE PREPARATIONS". IF GDR HAD STOPPED ONE OF OUR

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VEHICLES AND IT HAD TURNED BACK, WE FEAR THIS WOULD BE THE CASE. WE DOUBT THAT THIS WOULD EVOKE A TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY FOR ANYTHING OTHER THAN FOR A VERY SOFT COMPROMISE RESOLUTION WHICH COULD TIE OUR HANDS WHILE RUSSIANS MIGHT DISREGARD IT IN ACCORDANCE THEIR PAST CONDUCT.

THIS WOULD IN TURN PLACE US IN WEAK POSITION RE PUBLIC OPINION DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY BUILD-UP.

ON THE OTHER HAND, SUGGEST DEPARTMENT CONSIDER POSSIBILITY GALVANIZING GREATER PUBLIC SUPPORT IF A LIGHTLY ARMED CONVOY PROCEEDING TOWARD (AND NOT FROM) BERLIN WERE TO PROCEED ONWARD UNTIL STOPPED BY SHOW OF FORCE OF GDR. CONVOY SHOULD USE ARMS ONLY IN SELF-DEFENSE. CONVOY SHOULD SEEK TO PROCEED UNTIL PHYSICALLY MET WITH SHOW OF FORCE WHICH WOULD CONSTRAIN IT TO STOP. IT SHOULD NOT TURN BACK, BUT SHOULD REMAIN WHERE HALTED UNLESS CONDUCTED ELSEWHERE BY SUPERIOR FORCE. BELIEVE THIS WOULD CREATE CLEAR SITUATION FOR WORLD OPINION TO SUPPORT AND WE WOULD HAVE DEMONSTRATED OUR RESOLVE TO ASSERT OUR RIGHTS BEFORE UNITED NATIONS ACTION MIGHT TO SOME EXTENT TIE OUR HANDS.

SUBSEQUENT APPEAL TO UNITED NATIONS MIGHT THEN BE USED EITHER AS AN ATTEMPT TO GET RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD HELP FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS, OR TO MARSHALL WORLD OPINION FOR FURTHER USE OF FORCE IN IMPLEMENTATION OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONTACT WITH BERLIN, WHICHEVER SHOULD IN CIRCUMSTANCES BE DEEMED DESIRABLE.

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